

# CHIRP FEEDBACK

Issue No: 11

## What's in this Issue?

	Page
<b>MERCHANT SHIPPING</b>	
Near Collision (Overtaking 1) .....	1
Overtaking 2 .....	2
Overtaking 3 .....	3
Vessel Access During Cargo Ops. ....	4
Dover Strait Deep Water Route 1 .....	5
Dover Strait Deep Water Route 2 .....	5
<b>LEISURE</b>	
Smoke Alarms .....	5
Collision (Overtaking 4).....	6
<b>EDITORIAL</b>	
<b>REPORT UPDATE</b>	<b>6</b>
Current MAIB Investigations.....	7
Contact Us .....	7

**Number of Reports since the Last Issue: - 22**

### Report Topics Have Included:

Rosters & Fatigue  
 Alcohol Use  
 Near-collisions  
 Failure of Engine Fittings  
 Accident Investigation Failures  
 Fishing Vessel Safety Issues  
 Lifter Standards  
 ERRV Standards

### BACK ISSUES

Back issues of CHIRP FEEDBACK are available from our website: [www.chirp.co.uk](http://www.chirp.co.uk)

## REPORTS

REPORTS ARE PUBLISHED ONLY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE REPORTER AND ARE, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, IN THEIR OWN WORDS, EDITED ONLY TO REMOVE IDENTIFYING TEXT. THE SAFETY CONCERN(S) RAISED ARE BASED ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE REPORTER AND THEREFORE REPRESENT THE REPORTER'S PERSPECTIVE.

## MERCHANT SHIPPING

### NEAR-COLLISION (OVERTAKING 1)

**Report Text:** Own vessel at south end of TSS (Traffic Separation Scheme). Weather had caused speed to be reduced to 4 kts, course 230 (T). Another vessel (A), speed 15.7 kts was observed and plotted from 6nm astern overtaking on the starboard side and creating a close quarters situation. At 2 nm, the CPA (Closest Point of Approach) was observed to be less than 1 cable. I contacted the other vessel (A) on VHF Ch.16 and asked that my vessel be given a wider berth. The reply was that there was another vessel on his starboard side, followed by an unintelligible mumble. The other vessel (B) was some way ahead and proceeding in the same direction. I decided not to alter course to port because I was concerned about the heavy rolling that would occur due to the weather. In the event vessel (A) passed me at a distance of less than 1 cable with complete disregard for the effect of interaction between ships.

Vessel (A) then went on to overtake the vessel ahead (B) very closely, but the navigating officer of that vessel shone his searchlight onto the bridge causing him to complain bitterly, but to shear away.

Action taken on my part has been to report a "Near-miss" through the company SMS and recalculate the alternative action of altering course away from danger, but one should be able to expect a competent officer to be aware that his vessel was overtaking another too closely.

How early is "early" when one is the vessel being overtaken?

**CHIRP Comment:** This report was forwarded to the manager of vessel (A), who replied as follows:

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A Maritime Safety Newsletter

from **CHIRP** the Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting Programme

“...we do indeed encourage all our staff to report all Near Misses and/or Incidents as frequently as possible. Our Quality system mandates this reporting.

These reports are then consolidated at the head office, analyzed and sent back to the vessels across the fleet for their guidance and follow up. The onboard follow up is then reviewed through our Internal Auditing procedures amongst others.

In order to get to the root cause and analyze the alleged incident, it was important that we spoke to the person/s concerned at the time but understand your apprehension in releasing part information. We have however sent a message to all ships as a general guidance in such cases.

Anyhow, we are extremely grateful to you for bringing the alleged incident to our attention and continue to look forward to your kind support in the future.”

The Maritime Advisory Board is grateful for the company’s positive response to this incident and their understanding of the limits CHIRP sometimes imposes on the level of information it releases to protect individuals from negative consequences.

Rule 13 simply states:

“(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules of Part B, Sections I and II, any vessel overtaking any other shall keep out of the way of the vessel being overtaken.”

Although Rule 13 may be considered to stand alone, the Maritime Advisory Board believes the general guidance contained in Rule 8 should be applied:

“(d) Action taken to avoid collision with another vessel shall be such as to result in passing at a safe distance. The effectiveness of the action shall be carefully checked until the other vessel is finally past and clear.”

Studies have shown that in overtaking encounters there is a tendency to accept a closer CPA (Closest Point of Approach) than in crossing situations, despite the fact vessels are likely to be in close proximity for longer and the opportunity for other vessels to become involved and complicate matters is greater.


The second vessel overtaken appears to have used the signal prescribed in Rule 34 (d), or a version of it, with some success and the Maritime Advisory Board endorses this approach.

“(d) When vessels in sight of one another are approaching each other and from any cause either vessel fails to understand the intentions or actions of the other, or is in doubt whether sufficient action is being taken by the other to avoid collision, the vessel in doubt shall immediately indicate such doubt by giving at least five short and rapid blasts on the whistle. Such signal may be supplemented

by a light signal of at least five short and rapid flashes.”

## OVERTAKING 2

**CHIRP Comment:** This report contained insufficient detail to plot accurately, but the following diagram may be of assistance:



**Report Text:** The incident occurred in the afternoon in the Irish Sea. The weather was NW 5/6 with good visibility. Vessel "A" was on a NW'y course, ahead and to port was vessel "B" on a NNE'y course. Vessel "A" appeared to be the overtaking vessel coming up on the starboard quarter of "B" at a speed of about 20 kts. As they closed "A" called the "B" on #16, then onto #6 and the following conversation took place (this is not a word for word recollection of the conversation):

- "A" "What are your intentions?"
- "B" "Stand-by", then a few seconds later "I have checked your position and you are more than two points abaft my beam."
- "A" "Yes sir, what are your intentions?"
- "B" "You are more than two points abaft my beam."
- "A" "You are showing me a green light (in daylight?), you go around my stern."
- "B" "No sir, you are more than two points abaft my beam."

The conversation continued in the same vein for a couple of minutes then:-

- "A" "Ok sir, I shall alter course to starboard and we pass red to red?"
- "B" (Hesitantly) "Ok"

"A" "No sir, I am altering my course to port and we pass green to green? Sorry I do not understand English"

"B" "This has nothing to do with your understanding English, but the understanding of the collision regs."

"B" then suggested that the officer on "A" have a read of Rule 13 of the collision regs.

"A" then returned to #16 altered course to port and passed around the stern of the "B".

Without wishing to seem cynical, but there appeared to be a total lack of understanding of the "basics" of the collision regs in this incident and it gives me reason to be concerned.

**CHIRP Comment: The Maritime Advisory Board noted this incident bore many similarities with the collision between the Hyundai Dominion and Sky Hope, where the vessels were debating the Rules almost up to the point of collision! Rule 13 (c) states:**

**"When a vessel is in any doubt as to whether she is overtaking another, she shall assume that this is the case and act accordingly. "**

**There is clearly a language issue in this incident and whilst the English language used in this exchange may not be considered difficult; the use of Standard Marine Communication Phrases is recommended when dealing with an OOW (Officer of the Watch) whose first language is not English.**

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### OVERTAKING 3

Whilst routinely navigating the westbound lane of Terschelling-German Bight T.S.S. a number of fishing vessels were noted crossing our vessel from a general relative direction of port to starboard.

Initially, the vessel I wish to report was observed in a position on my starboard quarter proceeding along the German Bight –Terschelling T.S.S. and keeping to the North of the Westbound Lane. She was faster than all other vessels in the area and at first was seen to be overtaking all other vessels, leaving them to her port side, a practice that I deemed eminently satisfactory given her relative speed and the prevailing weather conditions.

Subsequently, it was noted that one fishing vessel, apparently crossing from our port to starboard, would cause our vessel some embarrassment; and as at that time we were engaged in overtaking a car carrier, I elected to contact the car carrier, to make him aware of our intentions regarding the (unknown) fishing vessel.

Whilst I was in the process of contacting the car carrier via V.H.F., we noticed that the fishing vessel had carried out an extraordinary manoeuvre and had altered to attempt to pass between the car carrier and ourselves. Our vessel was in hand steering and

we immediately altered our course to starboard and the car carrier altered her course to port both manoeuvres being carried out in order to prevent any potential embarrassment resulting from the alteration of the fishing vessel.

Being mindful of the vessel overtaking us on our starboard side I made a visual check to ensure that our large alteration of course to starboard would not impede his progress. At this time I observed that the she had also made a substantial alteration of course and had altered to port and was now directly astern of us and would soon be on our port side.

The overtaking vessel initially took up a position abaft our port beam and having resumed his course was now overtaking our vessel on our port hand. It was about this time that I noted that her distance off us was decreasing. At first we put this down to the presence of fishing vessels in the area, however, when she continued to close to my port hand, I became increasingly alarmed.

I opted to make a verbal contact with the overtaking vessel in order to alert her of our perceptions; the following conversation took place via VHF, channels 16 thence 77.

The conversation was not recorded on board our vessel and so is "ad hoc" rather than verbatim:

Having initially identified the vessel the following conversation took place at about 12:25:

"Me: Sir, you are overtaking my vessel at a course and distance that I consider to be unsatisfactory.

Overtaking Vessel: So, you will alter your course?

Me: Sir, you are crossing my vessel from port to starboard, you are overtaking me and in all aspects you are the give way vessel and I require you to alter your course to port.

Overtaking Vessel: Yes, I will alter my course to port at 12:45

Me: Sir, in 8 minutes, we will have a C.P.A. of 2 cables and I consider that to be unacceptable, please alter your course to port now.

Overtaking Vessel: O.K. O.K."

The overtaking vessel nevertheless maintained her course and speed.

I altered my course substantially to starboard in order to avoid a potential collision, the overtaking vessel: maintained her course and speed and made no subsequent contact with our vessel.

At precisely 12:45 hours local, it was noted on board our vessel that the overtaking vessel, having

apparently arrived at her designated predetermined a/c position, duly altered course.

**CHIRP** Comment: The report was forwarded to the operator of the overtaking vessel and the Maritime Advisory Board is grateful for their extensive investigation into the incident. A considerable amount of information was provided, but the following extracts are considered particularly relevant, with Vessel "A" being the overtaken and reporting vessel in the following extracts:

"We where 5 ships sailing in that lane, us 20,5kn. Vessel A 18kn. Vessel B and Vessel C both 12,5kn and vessel D 10kn. Heading in that lane is 251degree, Vessel A's heading was 257degree therefore she was moving towards the northern side of the lane. We used the AIS to see Vessel A's Destination, ETA & Draught. There was no information available, so we assumed that Vessel A was going to continue straight ahead. We on the other hand were going to turn port in less than 40 minutes, and therefore we turned port after we had overtaken the slow moving ships and still 1,3Nm aft of Vessel A. After reviewing the recording we did not come closer then 0,4Nm to Vessel A and that was on almost parallel courses. Our vessel was at the time of overtaking Vessel A on the southern side of the lane, with the distance to the border less then 0,6Nm."

And:

"Vessel A observed on my port bow while navigating north of the westbound lane of Terschelling-German Bight T.S.S. since she was making speed of about 20.6 Kts and our vessel was making 20.9 kts at the time of transit..."

**Company Comment:** Following the review onboard by the Master and the Fleet Safety Specialist we are satisfied that the actions taken by our vessel were satisfactory in the circumstances and did not depart from the practice of good seamanship.

**CHIRP** Comment: The Maritime Advisory Board accepts the benefit of hindsight, but believes the following additional points, based on the facts provided, may be worth noting:

- The speed of the overtaken vessel was 20.6 kts (18 kts being incorrect) and therefore the speed differential was only 0.3 kts. This meant the overtaking manoeuvre would take place over a considerable period of time.
- There was some doubt as to whether the vessel being overtaken was going to maintain her course or make a turn to port into the south-west lane of the TSS.
- In these circumstances; with a small speed differential and doubt as to the intentions of the vessel being overtaken i.e. she may have intended to turn to port, the decision to overtake

on the port side may not have been the best option.

- A speed reduction for a relatively short period would have resolved the doubt as to the intentions of the vessel being overtaken on completion of the westbound leg and, if subsequently required, to plan the overtaking manoeuvre. This option does not appear to have been considered in the analysis provided.
- It is entirely possible that the passing distance of 0.4' was only achieved because of the overtaken vessel's alteration of course to starboard.
- VHF appears to have been used extensively and this may have had a negative impact on the assessment of the situation.
- There is a possibility the OOW on the overtaking vessel was more focussed on making the next waypoint than monitoring the traffic situation.

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#### VESSEL ACCESS DURING CARGO OPERATIONS

**Report Text:** The gas carrier was due to sail at what on paper was just after low water. The vessel was moored port side to with only a short length of the parallel body properly alongside the jetty. Being low water and the vessel being of less than 100m LOA there was no proper means of access to the vessel available.

No gangway was rigged. This is not a criticism of the vessel, there is no way at low water that a vessel of that size can comply with the regulations concerning safe access as the distance from the jetty to the main deck and the peculiar deck layout of these vessels will I suggest make it impossible to comply in nearly every case. Those involved in the operation of the terminal treat this as a fact of life.

The vessel's agent gained access by climbing down a ladder on the end of the jetty and "stepping" over the waterman's workboat. The condition of the ladder used was a cause of concern but as it was daylight, dry and warm it was considered justified in using it as the alternative was to delay the vessel. The agent had to climb up the ladder on to the jetty when he left.

The gangway of the vessel was on the jetty. Crewmembers climbed up the jetty face to retrieve it. There was no ladder available and they clambered up and along to reach a ladder, rigged lines to lower the gangway to their colleagues on board and then clambered back on board. I was horrified at the risks taken by the deck crew and that no attempt was made to stop it.

The other issue which concerns me is that the vessel was working cargo whilst no means of access to or from the vessel was available in the event of an emergency from the time the gangway became

unusable on the falling tide(s) until it was available again on the rising tide(s).

I hope that you are able to place this information in the hands of the appropriate agencies in order to help protect the personal safety of crewmembers of vessels visiting this terminal and to ensure that the terminal tightens up its procedures.

**CHIRP Comment:** This report was sent to SIGTTO, who reproduced it in their own newsletter to alert all installations which might have similar issues. The SIGTTO publication "Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals" states at 6.6.6:

"It is the duty of both the ship and terminal to ensure that adequate and safe ship/shore access is provided.....Ideally, a jetty should provide a secondary means of escape from the ship in case the normal access is unusable in an emergency..."

The document does not appear to contemplate a primary access being unavailable!

SIGTTO added the comment:

"The practices that prevailed at the jetty on this occasion are in contravention of the requirements laid down in the UK Health and Safety Executive's (HSE) "The Bulk Transfer of Dangerous Liquids and Gases Between Ship and Shore".

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### DOVER STRAIT DEEP WATER ROUTE 1

Whilst passing Gris Nez, I heard someone asking Gris Nez traffic for permission to use the DW route. They noted that the chart said it was for vessels with draft over 16m and their draft was 8m, but still asked if it was OK. After a couple minutes delay, they came back and said "Yes, of course, no problem". This is outrageous!!! Unfortunately, I was not able to hear the name of the offending ship.

During my 2 transits this trip, I noted several others, including a container vessel from a well known company, who should know better.

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### DOVER STRAIT DEEP WATER ROUTE 2

Please find below a list of vessels which I have noticed recently using the Sandettie Deep Water Route apparently without any real justification:-

TYPE	DRAUGHT		DESTINATION
Container	12.5m	21.5 Kts	Hamburg
Container	9.6m	18.4 Kts	Rotterdam
Container	12.7m	22.5 Kts	Hamburg
Container	13.2m	22.5 Kts	Rotterdam

As far as I could see their use of the Deep Water Route did not compromise any other vessel.

**CHIRP Comment:** Reports continue to be received on issues related to the use of the Dover Strait DWR. A 2005 UK submission to IMO proposing changes was withdrawn, but the Maritime Advisory Board was pleased to hear recently that the AFSON (Anglo-

French Safety of Navigation) Committee will resume meetings this autumn. CHIRP will continue to forward any relevant information it receives to the MCA.

## LEISURE

### SMOKE ALARMS

**Report Text:** Smoke alarms can damage your safety. Whilst motoring in calm weather in a 10m motor sailor with the wheelhouse doors closed, suddenly (within 5 seconds) the whole yacht filled with acrid smoke, such that it was not possible to see from the wheelhouse through to the fore cabin, some 5m. There was no indication of the source and no flames visible. The engine was stopped, an engine fault being the immediate thought even though there was no change in engine noise; then it was realised that for the whole boat to fill with smoke so quickly it must have been dispersed through the (diesel-fired) blown air heater. The heater locker was opened gingerly, with a fire extinguisher at the ready, but there were no signs of smoke or flames. It was later found that the diesel cut-off solenoid had shorted, the heat generated being enough to vaporise the solenoid packing and the resultant thick smoke was sucked into the intake and dispersed round the boat. The intake is deliberately from that locker in order to provide forced circulation of air. So far, so good: the unexpected problem was the smoke alarms. There are three, one in each cabin (each can be closed off): all three sounded within seconds of the smoke appearing. The problem was that the resulting noise made it difficult to think clearly and would have made it completely impossible for the Coastguard to have distinguished the words of any transmission, or for me to have heard their reply. I could have taken the microphone outside the wheelhouse, but would still have been unable to hear their reply. The alarms are the common domestic type: it would be possible to fit a switch in the wheelhouse controlling them, but this would be complex and give scope for failure. There seems no easy answer to this problem and it is perhaps one which does not occur to most yachtsmen: it didn't occur to me until it happened.

**CHIRP Comment:** A number of accident investigations have established beyond doubt that smoke alarms can save lives. In this incident the alarms did exactly what they are supposed to do and provided prompt warning of a problem and had the crew been asleep, for example, this warning could have been a life saver.

The report does highlight the need to consider what is the best smoke detection system for your needs, where sensors should be located and what impact they might have on communication should they be activated. It is always a good idea to have a plan for the worst, whilst hoping for the best.

## COLLISION (OVERTAKING 4)

Whilst sailing, we noticed another yacht on a parallel course to ours and took no further notice. About 15 minutes later I noticed that the yacht was much closer and some 100m from our port quarter and then changed course coming straight for our stern. I then shouted to them to bear away as they were coming up fast. No change occurred even though there were people on deck and within hearing distance; they kept on coming, now some 15-20m behind, so I shouted again to bear away, no change of course. Impact occurred soon after with some damage to our yacht. I then shouted to stop, but the other vessel's crew ignored me and carried on sailing. We then furled the Genoa, started the engine and gave chase. After about 1/2 a mile we came alongside and I established the identity of the skipper and we agreed to exchange details on the VHF radio. We were both on the starboard tack; he was the windward boat and the overtaking boat. At no time before, during or after the collision did the other skipper alter course, slow up or try to avoid the collision.

**CHIRP Comment: The requirements of Rule 13 – Overtaking have already been referred to in this edition and there is a clear and unequivocal obligation upon the overtaking vessel to keep out of the way of the vessel being overtaken. Having said that the Maritime Advisory Board believes there is evidence (reproduced in these pages and elsewhere) to suggest knowledge and application of the collision regulations varies greatly. Skippers and those standing watch in this environment must exercise caution and anticipate and react to situations prudently.**

**The Board recommends that all navigators, in considering what action to take, should keep Rule 2 in mind:**

“(a) Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to comply with these Rules or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case.

(b) In construing and complying with these Rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, including the limitations of the vessels involved, which may make a departure from these Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger.”

## EDITORIAL

A number of overtaking incidents feature in this edition. As noted previously, there appears to be a marked reluctance to slow down. The Maritime Advisory Board (MAB) observed at its last meeting

that the kind of “traffic sense” we take for granted in cars, when we choose the right moment to overtake, occasionally appears to be absent on ships.

There does appear to be some evidence of misunderstanding between navigators and engineers with respect to the availability of the engine for manoeuvre and it may well be worth investing a little time discussing the issue and finding out exactly what the situation is. Alternatively, remaining on manoeuvring “full ahead” a little longer may be a good option in certain circumstances.

There have been some changes amongst the CHIRP Trustees and the MAB during the first half of 2006. Firstly, Capt Nick Roberts and Capt Andrew Mitchell retired from the Board and everyone at CHIRP is grateful for their contribution to the Programme. Capt Dennis Barber and Mr Michael Molloy have recently joined and we welcome the addition of their expertise. Finally, Capt Nigel Palmer has joined the CHIRP Trustees; increasing the number of maritime Trustees to five.

The varied technical backgrounds and experience of the MAB contribute significant value to the activities of the Programme. The removal of identifiers from the reports promotes balanced discussion of the issues and has even resulted in some of the Board Members receiving a peer review on occasion!

The Board's comments are not intended to be critical, but to help ensure that the maximum benefit is derived from each incident in the hope that an accident may be prevented. As mentioned a number of Board Members have discovered this when depersonalised reports and analysis from within their own organisations have been reviewed.

The MAB represents a gathering of technical expertise which is rare, if not unique and all that need be done to benefit from it is to report to CHIRP.

## REPORT UPDATE

### TACKLING UNMARKED FISHING GEAR

CHIRP has been advised by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency that they intend to conduct research into this issue and other navigational hazards with a view to identifying possible ways forward. In the interim CHIRP has been requested to continue to accept reports within its terms of reference, presenting them to relevant organisations, where appropriate.

The CHIRP trustees and Maritime Advisory Board are pleased the Programme has been able to assist in the data collection exercise.

**The MCA's 24hr Info No. is 0870 6006505.  
(Hazardous incidents may be reported to your local  
Coastguard Station.)**

## CURRENT MAIB INVESTIGATIONS

The following accidents/incidents are being investigated by the MAIB as at 09.06.06:

Vessel's name	Accident/incident type	Date of Incident
<b>fv Harvest Hope</b>	Loss of fishing vessel after she snagged her gear on pipeline NW of Aberdeen	28/8/05
<b>Anglian Sovereign</b>	Grounding of the Coastguard ETV off Shetland.	3/9/05
<b>fv Harvester/ Strilmoy</b>	Collision between fishing vessel engaged in pair trawling and offshore supply vessel in North Sea.	4/11/05
<b>Dieppe</b>	Grounding of Dieppe on the approach to Newhaven Harbour.	5/12/05
<b>Arctic Ocean/ Maritime Lady</b>	Collision between Arctic Ocean (container vessel) and Maritime Lady (general cargo vessel) in the Elbe, Germany resulting in the sinking of the Maritime Lady..	5/12/05
<b>CP Valour</b>	Grounding of Bermudan flagged vessel in a position of Praia de Faja about 120 miles North of Fayal Island	9/12/05
<b>fv Noordster (Z122)</b>	Capsize of Belgian registered fishing vessel, 11 miles off Beachy Head, resulting in two fatalities, one survivor in hospital and one crewmember missing	14/12/05
<b>Berit</b>	Grounding of cargo vessel off Gedser, Denmark.	5/01/06
<b>fv Emerald Star</b>	Contact with the Texaco Jetty Milford Haven.	18/1/06
<b>fv Green Hill</b>	Foundered at the entrance to Ardglass Harbour	19/1/06
<b>P&amp;O Nedlloyd Genoa</b>	Loss of containers from vessel during passage across the Atlantic	27/1/06
<b>Kathrin</b>	Grounding of cargo vessel on Goodwin Sands, Dover Straits	12/2/06
<b>Spruce</b>	Accident to person onboard specialised Barge carrier.	6/3/06
<b>Pamela S</b>	Fatal accident to person aboard vessel in Bridlington harbour.	30/1/06
<b>Stena Leader</b>	Damage to stern ramp on ro-ro ferry when mooring lines parted in strong winds in Larne harbour.	27/2/06
<b>Red Falcon</b>	Heavy contact with link-span by ro-ro ferry in Southampton. Four injuries reported.	10/3/06
<b>Yacht Pastime</b>	Fatal manoverboard from yachtin English Channel.	17/3/06
<b>fv Ocean</b>	Fire and subsequent sinking	17/3/06

<b>Challenge</b>	of UK registered fishing vessel.	
<b>Star Princess</b>	Fire aboard 109,000GT Bermuda-flagged cruise ship in Caribbean.	23/3/06
<b>Breaksea</b>	Main engine failure on tanker off Tuskar Rock, SE Ireland.	27/3/06
<b>Crescent Connemara</b>	Grounding of coastal tanker near Skye Bridge, Kyle of Lochalsh	8/4/06
<b>Nicos IV</b>	Accident to crewman during towing operation in Southampton Water	18/4/06
<b>mv Lowlands Maine</b>	Grounded on Varne Bank	26/4/06
<b>mv Neermoor</b>	Crewmember died when hatchway fell on him	27/4/06
<b>Sunsail 20 &amp; Sunsail 8</b>	Serious head injuries sustained by crew during gybes	02/4/06 & 11/4/06
<b>Atlantis RHIB</b>	Two occupants fell over -board from the RHIB off Yarmouth, Isle of Wight. One of the occupants was recovered by Wightlink ferry CENRED	5/5/06

MAIB reports and incident report forms are available on their website [www.maib.gov.uk](http://www.maib.gov.uk) and their 24 hr tel. no. is 02380 232527.

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# CHIRP

## MARITIME REPORT FORM

**CHIRP** is entirely independent of any other organisation involved in the maritime sector, whether regulatory, operational, manufacturer or supplier.

NAME: _____ ADDRESS: _____ POST CODE: _____ TEL: _____ DO YOU HAVE A PREFERRED DATE AND/OR METHOD FOR CHIRP TO CONTACT YOU?:-	1. THIS REPORT WILL ONLY BE SEEN BY CHIRP STAFF. 2. YOUR PERSONAL DETAILS ARE REQUIRED ONLY TO ENABLE US TO CONTACT YOU FOR FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT ANY PART OF YOUR REPORT. 3. YOU WILL RECEIVE AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 4. THIS REPORT FORM WILL BE RETURNED TO YOU OR DESTROYED.  <p style="text-align: center;"><b>NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT. THE REPORT WILL NOT BE USED WITHOUT YOUR APPROVAL.</b></p>
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PLEASE COMPLETE THE **RELEVANT** INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF - CREW POSITION			THE INCIDENT							
MASTER	<input type="checkbox"/>	NAVIGATING OFFICER	<input type="checkbox"/>	DATE OF OCCURRENCE		TIME				
CHIEF ENGINEER	<input type="checkbox"/>	ENGINEER OFFICER	<input type="checkbox"/>	LOCATION:			(LOCAL/GMT)			
DECK RATING	<input type="checkbox"/>	ENGINE RATING	<input type="checkbox"/>	AT SEA	<input type="checkbox"/>	DAY	<input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT <input type="checkbox"/>			
CATERING	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER (HOTEL, ETC)		IN PORT	<input type="checkbox"/>	HOURS ON DUTY BEFORE INCIDENT (IN PREVIOUS 24 HRS)				
THE VESSEL			TYPE OF VOYAGE		TYPE OF OPERATION					
TYPE (TANKER, BULK CARRIER, PASSENGER, ETC)			OCEAN PASSAGE	<input type="checkbox"/>	COASTAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT	<input type="checkbox"/>	OFFSHORE	<input type="checkbox"/>
YEAR OF BUILD / GT			INLAND WATERWAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER	<input type="checkbox"/>	FISHING	<input type="checkbox"/>	LEISURE	<input type="checkbox"/>
FLAG / CLASS										
EXPERIENCE / QUALIFICATION			WEATHER			VOYAGE PHASE				
TOTAL YEARS		YRS	WIND FORCE		DIRECTION	PRE-DEPARTURE	<input type="checkbox"/>	ARRIVAL/ PILOTAGE	<input type="checkbox"/>	
YEARS ON TYPE		YRS	SEA HEIGHT		DIRECTION	UNMOORING	<input type="checkbox"/>	MOORING	<input type="checkbox"/>	
CERTIFICATE GRADE			SWELL HEIGHT		DIRECTION	DEPARTURE/ PILOTAGE	<input type="checkbox"/>	LOADING	<input type="checkbox"/>	
PEC	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA	VISIBILITY		TRANSIT	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISCHARGING	<input type="checkbox"/>	
OTHER QUALIFICATIONS:			FOG	<input type="checkbox"/>	SNOW	<input type="checkbox"/>	PRE-ARRIVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER (SPECIFY IN TEXT)	<input type="checkbox"/>
THE COMPANY										
NAME OF COMPANY:								TEL:		
DESIGNATED PERSON ASHORE (OR CONTACT PERSON)								FAX:		

**ACCOUNT OF EVENT** - (PLEASE DESCRIBE THE EVENT, WHY IT RESULTED OR COULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN INCIDENT AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO PREVENT IT HAPPENING AGAIN. PLEASE CONTINUE ON ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF NECESSARY)



PLEASE PLACE THE COMPLETED REPORT FORM, WITH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF REQUIRED, IN A SEALED ENVELOPE (no stamp required) AND SEND TO:

**CHIRP • FREEPOST (G13439) • Building Y20E • Room G15 • Cody Technology Park • Ively Road • Farnborough • Hampshire • GU14 0BR • UK**

Confidential Tel (24 hrs): +44 (0) 1252 393348 or **Freefone** (UK only) 0808 100 3237 and Confidential Fax: +44 (0) 1252 394290

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Report forms are also available on the CHIRP website: [www.chirp.co.uk](http://www.chirp.co.uk)